The growth of world trade: The robustness of the evidence, 2017. Investigación & Desarrollo, No. 17, Vol. 2:  5-19.

Workforce Location and Equilibrium Unemployment in a Duocentric Economy with Matching Frictions, 2016. Journal of Urban Economics, 91(1), 26-44. With Etienne Lehmann and Bruno Van der Linden.

Work in Progress

“Search, labor supply and unemployment of married women in cities,” 2014. Mimeo. With Wei Xiao and Yves Zenou.

This paper studies female labor supply in an urban search matching framework. In a monocentric city, we examine how the female labor market interacts with the housing market. In the model, female unemployed workers allocate their time between managing the household affairs, such as raising children or doing household chores, and searching for jobs (search intensity). Female employed workers spend their time on working, commuting and taking care of the household affairs. Different than unemployed women, who make their time allocation decisions by themselves, employed women bargain with firms over wages and hours of work. We show that there is a unique equilibrium. To study the properties of the equilibrium, we perform a comparative statics analysis. After introducing bargaining over hours of work, the equilibrium is inefficient even under the Hosios condition.

“A matching model with heterogeneity in commuting and relocation costs,” 2014. Mimeo. With Anne Bucher.

This article studies the effect of individuals’ residential and job-search decisions on labor market outcomes in a duocentric closed economy. We build a theoretical urban search-matching model putting forward workers’ ability to commute and relocate between job centers. Conditional on individuals’ abilities, in steady state we identify three different types of workforce in each job center: stayers, commuters and relocated workers. Relocation and commuting decisions affect the population density in each job center and hence, unemployment rates. We find that changes in commuting and relocation costs have ambiguous effects on unemployment rates and provide the conditions under which they can be reduced. In the welfare analysis, we show that under the Hosios condition search externalities are internalized. However, the Hosios condition is not sufficient to guarantee efficient relocation of workers and search decisions.

“Social networks, commuting, and (un)employment rates,” 2015. Mimeo.

This article proposes a partial equilibrium model of job search in a multicentric economy where job-seekers leave unemployment through their social network and the market. Workers and firms are heterogeneous in their geographical locations and hence workers commute to their work places. Workers learn about open vacancies through their strong and weak ties or from directly contacting firms. In this setup, job-search activities involve deciding how far to search, conditional on the worker’s social network. Job-seekers choose the range of markets in which they are willing to participate. Choosiness, as defined by the job-search area, varies across individuals depending on the employment status of their strong tie. Job-seekers whose strong tie is employed are choosier than are those whose strong tie is unemployed. However, when a strong tie is unemployed, employed weak ties become more valuable to the job search. Employment (unemployment) rates rise (fall) with a larger job-search area. The effect of weak ties on employment rates is ambiguous.

“Matching equilibrium with commuting and skill heterogeneity,” 2012. Mimeo. With Bruno Van der Linden.

In this paper we study the equilibrium of a spatial matching model with on-the-job search and heterogeneous agents. Firms have simple and complex jobs and enter freely to two different job centers. Workers are distributed between the job centers and can be low- or high-skilled. We model wages under credible Nash bargain. We provide some analytical results which can settle the framework to explain unemployment rate disparities across regions in the Belgian economy.

Contributions to Publications

  • “Advantages of investment in Bolivia”, Fiscal Analysis Network – Ministry of Finance Bolivia, 2007.
  • “Strategy of Fiscal Decentralization of the Ministry of Finance”, Fiscal Analysis Network – Ministry of Finance Bolivia, 2006.
  • “Fiscal Report 2006”, Fiscal Analysis Network – Ministry of Finance Bolivia, 2006.
  • “Commission for the Revision of Public Expenditure”, Fiscal Analysis Network – Ministry of Finance Bolivia, 2004.
  • “Dossier of Social and Economic Statistics of UDAPE”, Analysis Unit of Economic and Social Policies (UDAPE), 2003.
  • “Design of a New Financial Strategy for Bolivia”, Debt Relief International (DRI), 2003.